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INTRODUCTION
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was passed in 
1974 primarily to address concerns about undisclosed kickbacks and 
referral fees that drive up the cost of real estate settlement services. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has con-
sistently maintained that RESPA bars charges for unperformed settle-
ment services even if those charges are not split between parties, but 
kept entirely by one provider. The real estate industry believes that 
such a reading turns RESPA into de facto price controls because any 
judge or jury could decide that some fees were not earned “for ser-
vices actually provided” if the price appeared too high. The Supreme 
Court must decide whether RESPA bans fees for unprovided services 
if those fees are not split, and in doing so must decide what defer-
ence, if any, should be accorded to HUD’s interpretation of the statute. 
ISSUES
Does the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 bar undivid-
ed, unearned fees, or does it only prohibit unearned fees that are split 
between two or more providers? 
If the words of RESPA do not provide an unambiguous answer to this 
question, what degree of deference, if any, should the courts give to 
HUD’s interpretation of the statute? 
FACTS
The petitioners are three couples, the Freemans, the Bennetts, and 
the Smiths, each of whom obtained a mortgage loan in Louisiana 
from Quicken Loans. Quicken charged the Freemans $980, and the 
Bennetts $1,100, as a “loan discount fee.” However, the borrowers 
argued, Quicken did not provide any “loan discount,” and as a result 
these fees were unearned. Quicken charged the Smiths a $575 “loan 
processing fee,” which Quicken claims was actually a mislabeled loan 
discount fee. In either case, the Smiths allege that they received noth-
ing for this fee and so it, too, was unearned. 
The Bennetts filed a putative class action suit in federal court, with 
which suits by the Smiths and the Freemans were later consolidated. 
All three suits alleged violation of § 2607(b) of RESPA, which provides 
that
[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept any por-
tion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for 
the rendering of a real estate settlement service in connec-
tion with a transaction involving a federally related mort-
gage loan other than for services actually performed.
The district court granted summary judgment to Quicken, following 
the majority of courts of appeals which had held that RESPA does not 
bar unearned fees unless they are split or shared. The district court 
refused to defer to HUD’s contrary interpretation of the statute, hold-
ing that the “plain language” of the statute dictated the result. (Under 
this reasoning, the district court found it unnecessary to address 
another argument put forward by Quicken: that a loan discount fee 
is part of the price of the loan, like interest, and not a fee for “settle-
ment services” that is governed by RESPA.) 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Edith 
Jones, upheld the district court ruling, finding that the language of 
§ 2607(b) “is unambiguous and does not cover undivided unearned 
fees.” The court reasoned that the phrase “no person shall give and 
no person shall accept” implies that the statute is only violated if two 
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parties act together, one giving and the other receiving the payment. 
Further, the court found that the phrase “portion, split or percentage” 
supported this reading because “all three words require less than 100 
percent or the whole of something.” Using the canon of construction 
noscitur a sociis (“it is known from its associates”), the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the words “percentage” and “portion,” which can 
sometimes include 100 percent or the entire portion, were intended 
to have the narrower meaning of less than the entirety connoted by 
“split.” Finally, the Circuit Court declined to give deference to HUD’s 
interpretations because the statute was clear, and HUD’s interpre-
tations—unlike regulations promulgated by notice and comment 
rulemaking—were statements of policy that lack the force of law.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham dissented. Although he agreed that 
HUD’s interpretation was not entitled to deference because he was 
not “persuaded that the process through which it was promulgated 
was sufficiently considered to merit Chevron deference,” he disagreed 
with the majority’s interpretation of the statute. He would have fol-
lowed a prior Second Circuit decision that held that the statute does 
bar undivided, unearned settlement charges. 
CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners (borrowers) argue that RESPA was intended to  
provide clear disclosure to consumers of the costs of settlement 
services and to bring down those costs through the elimination of 
abusive practices. According to the petitioners, the meaning of  
§ 2607(b) can best be determined by considering it in context with 
the preceding § 2607(a). 
Section 2607(a) expressly prohibits kickbacks:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, 
kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any agreement or  
understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to 
or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a feder-
ally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person. 
Subsection (b) then addresses unearned fees:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, 
split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the 
rendering of a real estate settlement service in connection 
with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage 
loan other than for services actually performed.
The borrowers argue that limiting § 2607(b) to cases where there is a 
divided charge would render it largely superfluous, because kickbacks 
are already barred under § 2607(a). Such a reading, according to the 
borrowers, would also thwart RESPA’s goal of protecting consumers 
from “abusive practices” that lead to “unnecessarily high settlement 
charges.” Moreover, to read “percentage” and “portion” to require 
a split is against common usage, under which each includes the 
entirety (such as 100 percent), and at odds with their use in other 
statutes. For example, a federal embezzlement statute prohibits the 
misappropriation of “any portion” of the public funds entrusted to a 
person. Clearly, the petitioners point out, that statute would include 
someone who misappropriated all of the funds under their control. 
Congress’s intent to include the entirety within these phrases is also 
shown by the reference to “any” portion or percentage, which could 
clearly include 100 percent. Further, holding that this phrase only cov-
ers divided fees would render the words “percentage” and “portion” 
mere surplusage, since they would add nothing that was not already 
covered by the word “split.” 
As to the Fifth Circuit’s argument that the statute requires both a cul-
pable giver and a culpable recipient, petitioners argue that the phrase 
“no person shall give and no person shall accept” does not require 
that both always be present. It simply contains two distinct prohibi-
tions, barring any party either from giving or accepting an unearned 
charge. 
Finally, petitioners argue that if the statute is ambiguous, courts 
should defer to the reading of the statute promulgated by HUD (a 
power now transferred to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, 
or CFPB). Congress authorized HUD to issue “regulations” and 
“interpretations” to carry out RESPA’s aims. HUD has always main-
tained that unearned fees are prohibited both in regulations and in a 
2001 Statement of Policy issued in response to a court case that had 
refused to apply RESPA to unearned, undivided fees. 
The respondent, Quicken Loans, argues that RESPA was primar-
ily a disclosure statute, like many other regulations of that period, 
intended to give consumers the information and power to shop for 
closing services, with market forces in turn bringing down costs. 
RESPA established the Good Faith Estimate of Closing Costs and 
uniform closing statements and required HUD to publish a booklet for 
consumers on settlement costs. RESPA also barred referral fees and 
kickbacks because these are, by their nature, hidden from consumers 
and prevent the market from working. In establishing this disclosure-
based system, respondent argues, Congress rejected the direct regula-
tion of settlement service prices. The petitioners’ position, according 
to the respondent, would essentially create price controls by allowing 
any judge or jury to determine that a fee was partly unearned due to 
overcharging. The statute is limited to changing business practices in 
the industry (i.e., referral fees and kickbacks), not directly regulating 
prices.  
Quicken maintains, as the Fifth Circuit found, that the phrase “no 
person shall give and no person shall accept” contemplates conduct 
by two culpable parties, supporting that argument by pointing out that 
the exact same phrase is used in § 2607(a), dealing with referral fees 
and kickbacks. This is also supported by the phrase “portion, split, or 
percentage,” which connotes the sharing or division of the fee. The 
petitioners’ argument that “portion” and “percentage” should be read 
to encompass the whole is contrary to noscitur a sociis, a traditional 
canon of statutory construction that “dictates that words grouped in 
a list should be given related meaning.” Here, Congress has chosen 
three words, each of which commonly denotes less than the entirety. 
Moreover, Quicken argues, each of these three words has a distinct 
meaning within the context of the statute. “Split” generally refers to 
an even division, “percentage” covers uneven divisions, and “portion” 
refers to situations where a provider gives away a component of the 
overall charge.
The legislative history further supports this reading, according to the 
respondent, because Congress rejected an alternative bill that would 
have regulated pricing, and directed HUD to study the settlement 
services industry and to report back on “the necessity for further 
legislation.” Among the items HUD was directed to consider was the 
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question of whether “federal regulation of the charges … is  
necessary and desirable.”
Finally, Quicken argued that RESPA, as a criminal statute, must be 
narrowly construed under the rule of lenity. 
As to the effect of HUD’s interpretation, the respondent argues that 
deference is not appropriate. The “ultimate question” under Chevron 
is “whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to 
treat an agency’s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or other 
agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of 
‘gap-filling’ authority.” Here, respondents argue, Congress never 
indicated an intent to rely on HUD’s expertise and did not intend to 
delegate such authority. Nor does the Policy Statement warrant defer-
ence because it was an agency interpretation (a statement advising 
the public of the position taken by the agency), not a regulation that 
has the force of law.
SIGNIFICANCE
Banks, title companies, and other settlement service providers are 
concerned about the outcome of this case because under the petition-
ers’ reading, and HUD’s long-standing policy, RESPA bars overcharg-
es. As stated in HUD’s 2001 Statement of Policy, one type of unearned 
charge that is barred by § 2607(b) is a fee “in excess of the reason-
able value of goods or facilities provided or the services actually 
performed.” Industry participants are concerned that any aggrieved 
borrower could assert that some charge exceeds the “reasonable 
value” of the services performed and that a judge or jury could thereby 
impose ex post, ad hoc price controls. This concern is exacerbated 
by the transfer of authority over RESPA regulations and enforcement 
from HUD to the newly formed CFPB. While there is a track record in 
dealing with these issues under HUD’s guidance, there is no assur-
ance that the CFPB will not take a harder line if it has the authority. 
This makes the Court’s reasoning on whether the statute is ambigu-
ous, and the standards for deferral to an agency’s interpretation, even 
more important. 
The petitioners tried to limit the concern that a decision in their favor 
would allow challenges to the price charged for a good or service. 
Rather, the petitioners argue, their position would only bar fees for 
goods or services that are not actually provided, and would not include 
examining whether a fee for actual goods or services was excessive. 
Such a reading, of course, would reject the position taken by HUD 
(and presumably the CFPB), that RESPA is intended to sweep broadly 
in cleaning up business practices in the settlement industry. It does 
sound odd, as well, to suggest that RESPA would prohibit a totally un-
earned fee, but not allow a challenge to, say, a $5,000 fee for recording 
the loan documents. 
It should be remembered, of course, that RESPA is not the only game 
in town. Unearned charges or overcharges can be challenged on 
numerous other grounds, such as state statutes barring consumer 
deception and unfair business practices.
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